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Abstract 
 
There is widespread consensus that current climate policy for passenger transportation is 
insufficient to achieve significant emission reductions in line with global climate stabilization 
goals. This article consequently has a starting point in the notion of ‘path dependency’ 
(Schwanen, Banister and Anable 2011) and an observed ‘implementation gap’ (Banister and 
Hickman 2012), suggesting that significant mitigation policies for transport do not emerge in 
the European Union because of various interlinked ‘transport taboos’, i.e. barriers to the design, 
acceptance and implementation of such transport policies that remain unaddressed as they 
constitute political risk. The paper argues that without addressing transport taboos, such as 
highly unequal individual contributions to transport volumes and emissions, social inequality 
of planned market-based measures, the role of lobbyism, and the various social and 
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psychological functions of mobility, it will remain difficult to achieve significant emission 
reductions in passenger transport. Yet, transport taboos remain largely ignored among EU 
policy makers because their discussion would violate ‘order’, i.e. harm specific interests within 
neoliberal governance structures and the societal foundations and structures of transport 
systems built on these.  
 
Key words: automobility, aviation, climate change, European Union, mobility consumption, 
policy, passenger transport 
 
 
Introduction 
Transport in the EU27 has grown considerably over the past decade. In the period 1995-2010, 
average annual growth in passenger transport was 1.3%, totalling 6,424 trillion passenger 
kilometres (pkm) in 2010, or an average of 12,869 km travelled per person per year (EC 2012). 
Notably, this figure does not include air and sea transport outside the EU27 and is a considerable 
underestimate of overall transport distances covered by EU citizens (e.g. Åkerman [2012] for 
Sweden). Transport accounts for 31.7% of final energy consumption in the EU 27, out of this 
82.1% as a result of road transport and 13.6% as a result of intra-EU air transport. This 
corresponds to 29.9% of CO2 emissions in the EU in 2009 (EC 2012). Transport emissions 
increased by 36% in the period 1990-2007, while emissions from all other sectors decreased by 
15% in the same period (EC 2011).  
 
Further growth in transport volumes and associated emissions is likely. Globally, the 
International Energy Agency (IEA 2012) anticipates a doubling of the number of passenger 
cars between 2011-2035. Aviation industry projections foresee global traffic volume growth 
(revenue passenger kilometres) in the order of 4.7% (Airbus 2012) to 5.0% (Boeing 2012) per 
year, leading to a tripling of air travel between 2005-2050 (IEA 2009, see also Owens et al. 
2010). This will considerably increase transport’s share in emissions, even in economies where 
overall transport volumes continue to grow at a more moderate rate. Clearly, such developments 
will make it difficult for the transport sector to stay within the limits of global climate policy 
objectives (e.g. Chèze et al. 2013). 
 
The EU has implemented two legislative instruments to reach its climate mitigation targets. The 
first is a trade scheme (the EU Emission Trading Scheme, ETS), imposing caps on CO2 
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emissions of large emitters (Directive 2009/29/EC). The second is legislation assigning targets 
for non-emissions trading sectors on a national level, covering transport, residential, services 
and some industry (Decision 406/2009/EC). Regarding the latter, emission reductions are to be 
achieved through various mechanisms, including, in urban areas, a phasing out of vehicles with 
internal combustion engines (ICEs), smaller road passenger vehicles, higher shares of collective 
transport, and urban mobility and infrastructure designs that facilitate walking and cycling (EC 
2011). Overall, the EC (2011) suggests that emissions from transport will decline, compared to 
2008, by 60% by 2050, with an interim goal of -20% by 2030. The EC outlines, however, that 
“curbing mobility is not an option” (EC 2011: 5), thereby putting legislation objectives and 
measures somewhat at odds with opinion that to achieve absolute emission reductions, energy-
intense forms of mobility will have to decline (Anable et al., 2012; Banister, 2008, 2011; 
Chapman, 2007; Daly and Ó Gallachóir, 2011; Dubois et al. 2011, IEA 2012, UNWTO-UNEP-
WMO 2008).  
 
To achieve emission reductions in transport in the EU, a wide range of market-based, 
command-and-control and soft policy measures are theoretically available (e.g. Friman et al. 
2012; OECD and UNEP, 2011; Sterner, 2007). However, while there is ample research on the 
effects of specific measures within these three categories, there exists, in the words of Banister 
and Hickman (2013: 292), a major ‘implementation gap’, defined as the way in which scientific 
knowledge is translated into policies. Various explanations have been provided for the existence 
of such a gap, including a societal and political focus on ecological modernization and neo-
liberal governance, i.e. belief systems comprising elements of technological innovation, 
(limited) market-based measures, and (voluntary) behavioural change, ultimately resulting in 
‘path dependency’ and social lock-in, i.e. a situation where (in)actions of the past condition 
future outcomes (Hall, 2013; Schwanen et al., 2011 ).  
 
This paper takes a similar, yet different viewpoint, based on the observation that a series of 
aspects with key relevance for passenger transport volume growth appear to remain largely 
ignored in the EU policy agenda. The paper thus confirms Banister and Hickman’s (2012) 
notion that available policy measures are not implemented because of various barriers (May, 
2013; Stough and Rietveld, 1997; Rietveld and Stough, 2005), though developing an alternative 
concept for explanation, which we term ‘transport taboos’. ‘Taboo’ is a word derived from the 
Polynesian ‘tabu’, denoting any sort of prohibition, i.e. something that is ‘forbidden’ (Radcliffe-
Brown, 1939). An important sub-context is that someone who does touch an object that is tabu 
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becomes tabu her/himself, with consequences: “he [sic] is regarded as being in a state of danger, 
and this is generally stated by saying that if he fails to observe the customary precautions he 
will be ill and perhaps die” (ibid: 6). Taboos are consequently “issues banned as constituting a 
risk” (Merriam-Webster, 2013: no page), and refer in the context of this paper to the political 
risk of touching upon any of the issues outlined in the following sections: To touch a taboo 
constitutes a violation of norms, and implies a danger for the transgressor to become 
marginalised and to ‘die’ politically.  
 
Anthropological research on taboos confirms that these are dangerous (Radcliffe-Brown, 1939; 
Douglas, 1966). This is because taboos represent ‘order’, and thus touching a taboo will create 
disorder, constituting a violation of norms and values: “the ideal order of society is guarded by 
dangers which threaten transgressors” (Douglas, 1996: 3). As Tetlock (2003) underlines, social 
or individual commitments to certain values are absolute, as these are sacred, and hence 
inviolable. Taboos are interlinked with sacred values, and thus represent issues that are virtually 
impossible to address, as this demands infringing on values closely linked to belief systems 
(cosmologies) and identities, causing cognitive dissonance as a result of disruption. When a 
taboo is actually violated, this will result in conflict with a given order, and result in ‘moral 
outrage’ (Tetlock et al., 2000), i.e. affective and behavioural reactions including “anger, 
contempt, and even disgust toward violators; and enthusiastic support for both norm 
enforcement (punishing violators) and metanorm enforcement (punishing those who shirk the 
burdensome chore of punishing deviants)” (ibid: 855).  
 
Transport taboos are thus issues that constitute fundamental, yet ignored cognitive and affective 
barriers to the implementation of significant climate policy in transportation. Taboos are 
different from barriers of implementation, because they exist on a fundamentally different level 
than structural, economic, technical or behavioural barriers: they cannot be addressed politically 
without considerable danger to the integrity of the norm violator, either among peers – which 
can be powerful individuals or organizations -, or the broader public or community.  
 
Like the Polynesian origin of the word tabu, taboos, and more specifically transport taboos, are 
explicitly geographical in nature. The degree to which an issue is taboo, or even not taboo at 
all, is contextually dependent. Indeed, the transport taboos presented in this paper are situated 
in place, with the political risk they constitute uneven, and varying across regions and nation-
states. The geographical focus of this paper falls on those issues that may be seen as most taboo 
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in EU climate policy, but examples also tease out national differences, highlighting pockets of 
both extreme resistance to particularly taboo issues in transport policy, and also where possible 
to places wherein the same types of issues have met less political resistance and been at least 
partially overcome through more sustainable transport solutions. 
 
As an example of a notable transport taboo at the national scale, a paradox in German transport 
policy is that the country, one of the major proponents of far-reaching EU climate policy, 
maintains its ‘no speed limits’ policy, even though the importance of such limits for climate 
mitigation is well documented (Asensio et al., 2014; Hill et al., 2012). Moreover, various 
opinion polls in Germany have indicated broad public support in favour of speed limits (e.g. 
ARD, 2013; BUND, 2007; Süddeutsche Zeitung, 2010). Yet, none of the political parties have 
been willing to raise a discussion of this taboo issue, which would likely lead to moral outrage 
by car associations and producers, who are powerful agents in German public discourse on car 
driving. As an example of a situation where a transport taboo was actually addressed, i.e. the 
very low price for fuel in Germany at the end of the 1990s, this had considerable negative 
consequences for the ‘transgressor’, the Green party. Demanding that a litre of fuel cost 5 
German marks (US$ 2.80) before the election in 1998, the party lost 0.6% of votes, declining 
from 7.3% in 1994 to 6.7% in 1998 (Bundeswahlleiter 2013). Notably, the opposition expressed 
moral outrage at the proposition, and voiced contempt in their answering election campaign 
“Lass dich nicht anzapfen” (“don’t let yourself be tapped”). 
 
Transport taboos exist, it is argued, because they constitute a risk to political decision makers, 
in the sense that their consideration would require transcending neoliberal forms of governance 
to initiate fundamental sociocultural change – in other words, a process creating disorder. The 
purpose of this paper is thus twofold. It introduces the concept of transport taboos as a new 
dimension to be considered in the discussion of progress in mobility governance, and underlines 
the need to more fully analyse transport taboos. At the same time, the paper emphasises the 
need to confront and overcome taboos, with the ultimate goal to provide a platform for a 
renewed discussion of the failure of policymakers to adequately address transport climate 
mitigation policy. Clearly, not all stakeholders will ignore all taboos, and not all taboos will be 
equally relevant to achieve stated policy goals. Hence, the subsequent introduction of the 
concept of transport taboos is a starting point for further debate: it is acknowledged that various 
knowledge gaps remain, and that empirical work is needed to confirm and identify taboos. 
Future research on taboos would allow to better address and, ultimately, overcome these. 
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Based on primarily sociological perspectives - as well as insights derived from science & 
technology studies and transport geography - the following sections introduce and discuss a 
non-exhaustive list of transport taboos that may be considered key obstacles to the successful 
implementation of significant climate mitigation policy in transportation. Focus is placed on 
the two most relevant transport modes from an emissions perspective, i.e. cars and aviation.  
‘Taboos’ were identified on the basis of the authors’ personal observations and their 
interdisciplinary review of the secondary literature. That material has been structured and 
summarized into 10 interrelated and interdependent categories of transport taboos in the EU 
that are discussed sequentially but not in order of importance (see table 1 for a summary list of 
the taboos and their brief explanations). It needs to be noted that the list of transport taboos as 
presented in this article is subjective, and not exhaustive with regard to the number of issues 
identified or the choice of references selected to justify each of the aspects. Case studies to 
substantiate the taboos are not systematically employed and empirical research is needed to 
confirm taboos. Case studies are also drawn mainly from across the EU to help illustrate the 
issues being discussed on an ad hoc basis: exceptions in a few countries to the examples 
presented are highlighted. The list of transport taboos discussed in this paper is likely to be 
incomplete; the purpose of this paper is to provide evidence for the existence of various taboos; 
to fully explore each of these taboos in greater analytical depth is beyond its scope.  
 
Table 1 Summary of EU transport taboos and brief explanations 
Transport taboo Brief explanation 
Transport mitigation strategies lack credibility Mitigation in transportation lacks a credible 
basis in terms of a clearly defined and monitored 
emissions target. Industry and policy makers put 
emphasis on technological solutions yet to be 
developed. Technological optimism is not 
matched by transport scenarios. 
The contribution to transport volumes is highly 
skewed 
Rather than participation in auto- and aero-
mobility being equally distributed in society, a 
minor share of highly mobile travellers, mostly 
from higher income classes, are responsible for a 
significant share of the overall distances 
travelled, as well as emissions associated with 
this transport. The issue is particular acute in the 
context of aeromobility. 
Highly mobile and environmentally aware 
travellers will not reduce their mobility 
Highly mobile travellers, including the most 
environmentally aware, are unwilling to change 
their mobility patterns, such as by flying less. 
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A large share of transport is unrelated to 
specific transport needs 
Much transport demand is induced through low 
prices and/or status-related incentives. Not 
fulfilling physical transport needs, these kinds of 
trips are arguably dispensable. 
Market-based measures will effect in particular 
the less wealthy 
There are social inequalities in the affectedness 
of market-based policy measures due to 
differences in income levels, with low-income 
groups to be disproportionally affected. The 
mobile elite will be not be affected enough to 
change behaviours. 
Energy-intense transport is the least taxed and 
the most subsidized 
Market distortions exist wherein aviation, and to 
a lesser extent cars, remain over-subsidized. The 
costs of the most harmful transport modes are 
thus externalized.  
Lobbyism influences and waters down transport 
policy 
There is considerable influence of automobile 
and aviation organizations on the design of 
policies. The sectors protect themselves through 
linking mobility to fundamental human rights. 
Key issues in climatically sustainable transport 
systems remain ignored 
Despite wide recognition of the importance of 
several measures for mitigating car emissions, 
such as reducing speed limits and implementing 
congestion charges, such important issues are 
typically overlooked. 
Mobility consumption patterns represent the 
very fabric of contemporary societies  
 
Mechanisms fostering high mobility patterns are 
embedded in socio-cultural norms, with habits 
of consumption difficult to change due to their 
entanglement with identities and affective 
dimensions. 
Emerging societal structures are ignored Scenarios projecting transport volume growth do 
not account for changes in family structures and 
the stretching of social relations, which 
increasingly requires bouts of movement for the 
maintenance of social networks. 
 
 
 
Transport mitigation strategies lack credibility 
As outlined, transport accounts for 29.9% of CO2 emissions in the EU (in 2009; EC 2012). Yet, 
even though significant continued growth in transport volumes is expected (figure 1a, b), 
indicating vast discrepancies between emission reduction objectives and business-as-usual 
developments, there is no evidence of a political acknowledgement of the sector’s growth in 
contradicting mitigation objectives, and no systematic assessment of the effectiveness of 
various policy measures to reduce emissions. “Roadmaps” for the EU27 as presented in figure 
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1b appear to anticipate particularly steep emission reductions after 2030, though it remains 
unclear whether such scenarios are probable. Hill et al. (2012: xiii) summarize that there is: “a 
need to stimulate a broad range of technical and non-technical options”, “a need for a wide 
range of complementary policy instruments”, and, overall, “an urgent need for action”. This 
supports the notion that, currently, there is no effective integrated mix of market-based, 
command-and-control and soft policy measures for mitigation in transport in the EU27, nor 
specific, monitored year-on-year reduction goals. 
 
 
Figure 1a, b: EU overall emissions trajectories against transport emissions 
Source: Hill et al. 2012 
 
Country specific assessments of options to reduce emissions from transport come to similar 
conclusions. For instance, Daly and Ó Gallachóir (2011) suggest that car emissions in Ireland 
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in 2020 will be 2% above those of 2005, while a reduction of 20% is required across all non-
ETS sectors. An important aspect of the Ireland model is that considerable rebound effects are 
included, while these appear to have been ignored in other EU scenarios (e.g. Dray et al. 2012; 
Hill et al. 2012). Consequently, technological innovation alone is unlikely to achieve climate 
targets, even though it is acknowledged that national policies may exist that consider a variety 
of policy interventions.  
 
The mismatch is particularly evident in aviation, where the International Air Transport 
Association (IATA) has presented a vision of “carbon neutral growth” achievable in the 
“medium term” future (IATA, 2009). In its “four-pillar strategy”, the organization outlines 
timelines, acknowledging that the technology that will be necessary to achieve these goals is 
unknown, and referring to “revolutionary engine architectures” to be implemented after 2020. 
In comparison, the International Energy Agency (IEA, 2009) has highlighted that technical 
capacity to reduce the energy intensity of new aircraft is equivalent to 0.6%–1.0% per year on 
average and that the annual historical rate of improvement in load factors (approximately 0.2% 
per year) could reach close to its upper limit by 2025. The reliance on biofuel as a technological 
solution remains problematic because of uncertainties over full life-cycle emissions and land-
use requirements that put energy and food crops in conflict (Stratton et al. 2010; UNEP, 2009; 
Vera-Morales and Schäfer 2009). Overall, it is obvious that industry puts great emphasis on 
technological solutions yet to be developed, while policy makers also put emphasis on 
technological progress (e.g. EC 2011). This technological optimism is not matched by transport 
scenarios, which indicate a significant gap between emission pathways and mitigation 
objectives (e.g. Anable et al. 2012; Dubois et al. 2011; Dray et al. 2012; IEA, 2012; UNWTO-
UNEP-WMO, 2008). Even though it is obvious that there is a gap and no plausible strategy to 
close it, this remains largely undebated in political circles, as closing this gap would require 
fundamental changes in the neoliberal structures of transport provision that facilitate mobility 
growth, e.g. ‘powering down’ (Urry, 2013). 
 
The contribution to transport volumes is highly skewed 
There is a common belief that corporeal mobility is global, involving populations in developed 
and developing countries. For instance, car media suggest that the global number of cars now 
exceeds 1 billion (Ward’s Auto, 2011), while IATA reports that airlines carried 2.8 billion 
passengers in 2011 (IATA, 2013). Such figures foster an understanding that auto- and 
aeromobility involve most of the world population. This ignores that there are huge differences 
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in the power geometries of individual mobility (e.g. Gössling et al. 2009, Schäfer et al. 2009), 
with a minor share of highly mobile travellers being responsible for a significant share of the 
overall distances travelled, as well as emissions associated with this transport. For instance, 
with regard to automobility, it has been shown that Swedish men with incomes over €27,800 
per year use three times as much energy for car travel than men earning €9,300-13,900 per year, 
while men in the highest income category were also shown to drive 13% more than women in 
the same income category (Carlsson-Kanyama and Lindén, 1999). 
 
Differences are far greater in aeromobility. In the UK, 61% of overall personal (non-business) 
transport emissions are produced by just 20% of the population, with air travel over comparably 
long distances being the dominant contributor (Brand and Preston, 2010). A survey of the 
French population's leisure travel patterns revealed that 5% of the population account for an 
estimated 50% of the distances travelled (Gössling et al. 2009). Likewise, a survey among 
Swedish air travellers found individuals reporting up to 300 return flights per year, with the 11 
most frequent flyers (3.8% of the sample) accounting for 28% of all flights made (ibid). In a 
survey of leisure travellers in Zanzibar, Tanzania, the 10 most frequent flyers had covered an 
average 180,000 pkm each in 2002 & 2003 (two years; air travel only), with a maximum of 24 
countries visited by one traveller in this period (Gössling et al. 2006). The mobility of some 
more privileged individuals may be frequent and long-distance, substantiating Cohen et al.’s 
(2011) notion of ‘binge flying’. This also needs to be seen in the light of the fact that most 
people’s aeromobility is extremely limited. Peeters et al. (2007a) estimate that taking into 
account multiple international flights made by the same individuals, a share as large as 97-98% 
of the world’s population does not participate in international air travel in a given year.  
 
There is also a notable regional distribution in transport volumes, with almost one third of all 
air travel, measured in trip numbers, taking place in the USA (Bureau of Transportation 
Statistics, 2008, IATA 2008). This will shift, however, as rapidly expanding middle classes in 
countries such as China, India and Indonesia fuel aero-expansion (see e.g. Voigt 2011 for 
Indonesia). Finally, there is a relationship between flight length and emissions, with the longest 
flights (top 20%) accounting for about 78% of emissions from aviation (Peeters et al. 2007b). 
Again, evidence suggests that it is mostly men in the higher income classes consuming 
aeromobility, with for instance one Swedish survey finding that all of the most highly mobile 
travellers (>100 flights per year) fell into the highest >€100,000 annual net income group 
(Gössling and Nilsson, 2010). 
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Overall, these results suggest that a comparably small share of the world population contributes 
a comparably large share to transport volumes, and an even greater share of transport energy 
use and emissions, due to the use of more energy intense transport modes among the highly 
mobile. For a rough estimate, a highly mobile person flying 100,000 pkm per year in business 
class will generate 25 t CO2 (at 0.250 kg CO2 per pkm, i.e. twice the amount of emissions in 
economy class). This amount will rise considerably if private aircraft are involved. In 
comparison, average per capita emissions from all transport in the EU27 are in the order of 2 t 
CO2 per year (13,000 pkm, mixed transport, at 0.15 kg CO2 per pkm). 
 
Flying, as well as frequent driving with powerful cars is largely a domain of the wealthy, with 
clear relationships between income and mobility consumption (Casey, 2010, Schäfer et al. 
2009). Consequently, it is in particular the economic, political and cultural elites, those who 
also tend to be more politically powerful, who are contributing most to global emissions of 
greenhouse gases, and also using the most energy intense transport modes such as private jets 
or first class flights (Gössling et al. 2009). Paradoxically, an emerging class of ‘sustainability 
elites’ may exacerbate the problem: Holden and Linnerud (2011) found that individuals in 
Norway with pro-environmental transport attitudes travel more by plane for leisure than those 
without. In summary, evidence suggests considerable inequalities in individual contributions to 
emissions that remain taboo in political discussions, particularly with regard to aviation, even 
though there is considerable evidence that without addressing the mobility patterns of the highly 
mobile, who are often themselves influential in policymaking, it will be difficult to achieve 
overall reductions in emissions from transport. The distribution of aeromobility remains poorly 
understood globally, and further empirical work is needed, perhaps in cooperation with airlines, 
to better understand inequalities in mobility consumption. 
 
Highly mobile & environmentally aware travellers will not reduce their mobility 
As outlined, without changes in the mobility patterns of the most mobile, it becomes even less 
likely to achieve significant emission reductions. Yet, there is considerable evidence that 
mobility elites are unlikely to change their transport patterns. Anecdotal evidence suggests, for 
instance, that politicians have been provided with frequent flyer status by airlines, and that they 
can use bonus miles acquired on the job for private use (news.at, 2013; see also Gössling and 
Nilsson, 2010). Politicians are also provided with company car privileges, while the voluntary 
choice of a service bicycle or free use of public transport is fraught with difficulties 
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(Süddeutsche Zeitung, 2011). More systematic surveys of attitudes of the highly mobile to 
change travel patterns suggest that there exists a limited willingness to travel less, or with 
reduced privileges (Cohen and Higham, 2011; Kroesen, 2012; Mair, 2011; Scott et al. 2012). 
Even the most environmentally aware – and often also most active – travellers appear unwilling 
to willing to change travel behaviour (Barr et al. 2010; Cohen et al., 2013; Gössling et al. 2009; 
McKercher et al. 2010). The UK Sustainable Consumption Roundtable (2006: 35) concluded 
that flying less is not imaginable: “consumers struggle with the idea of flying less. They 
candidly acknowledge that the prospect of cutting back on flights is extremely unattractive” 
(see also Randles and Mander 2009; Hares et al., 2010). The situation is more complex for car 
driving, where better options exist to switch modes (see Anable, 2005; Schwanen and Lucas 
2011). In conclusion, there is considerable resistance by in particular the most mobile to change 
mobility patterns, even though further empirical research is needed to better understand these 
interrelationships.  
 
A large share of transport is unrelated to specific transport needs 
There is a general notion that all transport is necessary, as communicated by airlines and car 
lobby organizations. For instance, airlines and air travel organizations have for years used 
images of interpersonal reunions to show that flying is an important means of social 
connectivity. Likewise, the importance of aviation for conducting business has been taken up 
in countless campaigns. IATA’s web-campaign (January 2013) states that “Nearly 3 billion 
people fly annually for business and pleasure. Flying connects” as well as that “3.5% of the 
global economy relies on aviation. Aviation supports business”. In the light of aviation’s 
contribution to climate change (e.g. Douglas et al. 2011), ethical questions regarding the various 
purposes of travel may be raised. Though it may be difficult to assign normalizing values to 
specific motivations for travel as well as destination choices, there are differences between, for 
instance, driving to work and participating in scenic drives, a visit to see family and a stag 
weekend away, and a longer-term annual holiday and a short-term long-haul “breakneck break” 
(Mills, 2008: no page). These offer opportunities for research into the ethics of greenhouse gas 
emissions associated with transportation. 
 
There is also evidence that mobility can be induced, or fulfil purposes other than transport 
needs. For instance, Nilsson (2009) suggests that as much as 60% of Low-Cost-Carrier (LCC) 
demand may be stimulated, in the sense that there is no specific motivation for travel, other 
than the fact that a destination is offered at a very low price. Similar mechanisms may be at 
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work when airlines offer ‘All You Can Fly Passes’ (e.g. Wideroe, 2013), or when airlines offer 
flights based on a very low rate as a sales argument, without even indicating the destination 
(e.g. Ryanair’s 2014 marketing campaign). Evidence also suggests that frequent flyers engage 
in additional flights to maintain their traveller status (Gössling and Nilsson, 2010) and that 
frequent flying is related to status and social identity, i.e. reasons other than physical transport 
needs (Hibbert et al. 2013a, b). As noted by CNN (2010), as many as 50,000 members of the 
organization FlyerTalk may go on ‘mileage runs’ towards the end of the year to retain or attain 
elite airline status. Given the energy-intensity of flying first class compared to economy class, 
there is also an issue of individual comfort at the expense of disproportional individual 
contributions to climate change. Travel journalists and the media are known to promote long-
haul destinations because of ‘freebies’ provided by these destinations, or a general need to ‘fill 
space’ in newspapers and magazines, creating and sustaining notions of ideal or ‘must-see’ 
destinations (e.g. Bright and Matsuura, 2009). Group deal-of-the-day websites, such as 
’Groupon Getaways’, further induce demand by heavily reducing package holidays bundled 
with air travel; with a short purchase window and by showing how many others have bought 
the package that day, such institutions produce perceptions of scarcity and a ‘bandwagon’ effect 
amongst consumers. Very limited research appears to have been conducted on these issues. 
 
Regarding automobility, the size and power of cars is often unrelated to transport needs, and 
many trips may not be necessary (e.g. scenic drives, driving and flying for sport). Overall, a 
considerable share of trips by both car and aircraft is consequently made for reasons with 
varying degrees of urgency or necessity. While it is difficult to assess whether status- motivated 
travel necessary for personal wellbeing (Kroesen and Handy, 2014) can be weighed against the 
loss of livelihoods due to climate change in developing countries, the lack of a political 
discussion of these interrelationships, and unwillingness to openly question more ‘flippant’ 
transport decisions at the risk of being seen as against mobility freedoms, indicates a taboo 
deserving further study.   
 
 
Market-based measures will effect in particular the less wealthy 
Most measures to reduce emissions in transport are market-based. Regarding aviation, the EU 
has sought to integrate the sector in an open ETS, which remains the only regional policy 
approach for the aviation sector worldwide. According to the European Commission, inclusion 
of aviation in the ETS would achieve reductions of 183 Mt CO2, or the equivalent of a 46% 
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reduction compared to a business-as-usual scenario. However, as the Commission points out, 
the option of purchasing credits from within the EU ETS means that the sector will continue to 
grow, and emission reductions will be achieved in other sectors, where costs are lower (Ares, 
2012).  
 
The European Commission (EC, 2006) produced four different scenarios looking at EU ETS 
prices of €15 and €6 per t CO2, and including or excluding international credits. These translated 
to cost increases in the price of a typical return flight within the EU in 2020 by between €1.8 
and €9. Analyses of the implications of costs increases under various ETS or climate policy 
scenarios all conclude that those currently planned will not significantly change travel flows 
(Pentelow and Scott, 2010, 2011) or reduce absolute emissions from the aviation sector (Ares, 
2012; Jotzo, 2010; Mayor and Tol, 2009; Scott et al. 2010). In the light of low costs of 
purchasing emission allowances, the EU ETS is thus unlikely to have any de facto importance 
for airlines and growth in aeromobility, while flights to and from non-European countries are 
not included at least until 2020 (EC 2014). Vice versa, various forms of subsidies exist, which 
make flying cheaper in proportion to mobility levels (see following taboo). 
 
With regard to automobility, various mechanisms have been identified that reduce the burden 
of market-based measures on the wealthy and more mobile. First of all, about 50% of all new 
passenger car sales in the EU are company cars, which are often used by employees for both 
for business and personal travel (cf. Copenhagen Economics 2009). Where companies pay for 
cars and fuel use, this provides personal incentives to buy larger cars and to drive more. The 
EC (2011) has also recognized that vehicle taxation is not only linked to environmental 
performance, but as well to value, cylinder capacity, engine power and weight, noting that (EC 
2011: 120): “… the majority of the Member States has introduced car taxes, during the last 
years, which are differentiated on the basis of the CO2 performance of individual passenger 
cars.” While this introduces taxation proportional to emissions, it does not consider the role of 
income inequalities. SUVs, for instance, may roughly use twice as much fuel per km as a small 
car, but these are also more likely be driven by people with several times the average income. 
As an example, the top 10% of earners in Germany earn 41% of the gross market income (in 
2003; Bach et al. 2009; see also Credit Suisse 2013). Proportionally seen, fuel taxes might thus 
be more burdensome for low-income groups driving smaller cars.  
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The overall question is thus whether CO2 permit prices or fuel taxes will lead to price increases 
convincing consumers, and in particular the ‘high-energy hypermobiles’, to drive less or to shift 
to other vehicles or transport modes. Similar inequalities also exist with regard to measures 
seeking to punish traffic violations such as speeding, as penalties are identical for all income 
groups. Overall, market-based measures neither consider individual contributions to transport-
related emissions, nor the importance of income/wealth inequalities in affecting transport 
behaviour. This taboo, which has similar political risks to increasing income tax rates in higher 
tax bands, whereby asking the wealthy to carry a larger share is invariably contested, is also of 
relevance with regard to existing and future subsidies (e.g. Winchester et al. 2013). Further 
research into these inequalities and their impact on mobilities is consequently required. 
 
Energy-intense transport is the least taxed and the most subsidized 
It is generally recognized that there exist considerable market distortions with regard to train, 
bus, car and air travel. Most notable is that aviation, the most energy intense form of transport, 
is exempted from VAT on international flights - a subsidy corresponding to a revenue shortfall 
of $10 billion in the EU according to Transport & Environment (2012) -, and does not pay fuel 
taxes. In further contradiction of sustainable transport policy principles, scheduled and low cost 
carriers continue to receive direct subsidies. Ryanair alone may have received subsidies in the 
order of €800 million in a single year, though not even members of the EU parliament appear 
to know the exact amount (see e.g. a statement by a member of the EU parliament: Cramer, 
2013).  
 
The mobility patterns of air travellers are consequently subsidized, also including 
disproportionally high rewards for the most mobile, as in the case of frequent flyer programmes 
granting additional air miles to the highest status classes, options to receive air miles from credit 
card purchases, to use work-related air miles for private purposes, or to use air miles for status 
upgrades to business class, with corresponding increases in energy use. As an estimated 7-8% 
of all flights are being paid for with air miles (Gössling and Nilsson, 2010; The Economist, 
2005), there is a general financing mechanism for air travel of the highly mobile by the less 
mobile and cross-subsidizing of aviation through general consumption. German Lufthansa, for 
instance, reportedly had to plan for bonus programme payments of €620 million in 2010 alone 
(Spiegel 2012).  
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The prevailing VAT exemption on international flights is furthermore proportional to the cost 
of air travel (T&E 2012), i.e. those travelling more frequently, over long distances or in 
business/first class, are the most subsidized. Moreover, other subsidies are paid as governmental 
support to national airlines in times of crisis (cf. Doganis 2006), or regional airports with year-
on-year negative balance sheets. This situation makes it difficult for international coach and 
high-speed train services to compete with aviation. For a national review on subsidies see e.g. 
Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency (2011). 
 
With regard to cars, the European Commission (2011, based on Copenhagen Economics 2009) 
has stated that direct tax revenue losses due to preferential taxation of company cars may 
approach 0.5% of EU GDP (€54 billion) in the 18 member states studied. Associated welfare 
losses from distortions are estimated to equal another €15 to €35 billion, while emissions 
associated with incentives to buy more fuel and larger cars are in the order of 21-43 Mt CO2, 
i.e. equivalent to around 2-5% of road transport emissions. In comparison, Becker et al. (2012) 
estimate that an average car in the EU27 entails costs to society in the order of €1,600 per year 
or €0.05 per driven km, with 41-60% of this related to traffic accidents and 15-37% to climate 
change. These costs are externalised, i.e. paid for by society as a whole. A similar calculation 
was presented for Copenhagen, concluding that the net social cost of each km driven by car 
was €0.50, while the cost of a km cycled was €0.08, a result of health benefits and reduced 
pollution (City of Copenhagen 2009, 2012). Even though the costs/benefits of the different 
transport modes are well documented, these are not taken up politically to internalize costs of 
in particular aviation and cars, or to favour the expansion of cycle infrastructure in line with its 
economic benefits to society (for the notable exception of Copenhagen, Denmark see Gössling 
et al. 2014). The ignorance of transport costs in policy planning frameworks is consequently an 
issue that should receive greater attention. 
 
Lobbyism influences and waters down transport policy 
There is widespread evidence of lobbyists’ influence on EU transport policy, for instance with 
regard to taxation, speed limits, alcohol limits, emission trading, congestion charges or toll 
roads. Key elements of campaigns to prevent legislation introducing climate mitigation include 
the underlining of the respective sector’s benefits to society, its comparably small contribution 
to environmental change, relative improvements in environmental performance over the past, 
as well as a positive outlook on future technological solutions (Gössling and Peeters 2007; see 
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also Brulle 2013). Messages can also be rhetorically linked with fundamental human rights. As 
an example, IATA (2012: 7) claims:  
 
“…already our industry supports the livelihoods of 56.6 million people and USS2.2 trillion in economic 
activity. And governments must understand that with an enabling policy environment we could do much 
more. When aviation gets stronger, so does the economy”.  
 
In its current web-campaign (January 2013), the organization also suggests “Aviation will cut 
its net carbon emissions 50% by 2050 (compared to 2005). Flying is sustainable”. Such 
campaigns are intended to influence public opinion as well as policy makers, and remain 
unchecked for facts. As an example, Scandinavian Airlines retains one of the oldest fleets in 
Europe, but regularly presents itself as an environmental champion. Its campaign “Can I fly 
with a clear environmental conscience? Yes, you can!” (SAS 2008) has for instance sought to 
communicate that aviation is responsible for only 2-3% of global emissions, while a national 
comparison revealed that air travel of Swedes corresponds to 11% of Swedish emissions 
(Åkerman 2012). The campaign also suggests that specific emissions per pkm will decline by 
42% to 2020, i.e. about 4% per year, which is twice the amount of industry objectives (e.g. 
IATA 2009), and more than four times observed historical efficiency gains (IEA 2009). 
Whether such propositions are likely to become reality is another question entirely, pointing at 
the need for emission monitoring programmes for airlines, to confirm or question industry 
claims. 
 
The situation is more complex for automobility. Douglas et al. (2011) report that clusters of 
organizations with similar interests, such as car manufacturers, car retailers, car hire companies, 
garages, motoring organizations, oil companies, and road builders co-operate to prevent 
progress on key issues in sustainable transport, such as speed limits or emission targets. Car 
manufacturers spend 2.5-3.5% of their revenue on marketing, as well as funding of professional 
lobbyists and organizations to oppose fuel duty rises, emissions targets or speed cameras 
(Douglas et al. 2011). Arguments are built on ‘freedom of choice’ and ‘fundamental human 
rights’ (ibid), and driving a car has also been interlinked with constitutional rights; questioning 
such unfettered freedom to move is consequently particularly taboo. As an example of the 
success of such strategies, Douglas et al. (2011) describe how, in 2007, car manufacturers and 
related organizations successfully used a public relations campaign in German newspapers to 
question mandatory EU CO2 emissions targets. The campaign gained the support from the 
German chancellor, who opposed and prevented new EU legislation on various occasions. 
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Particular attention was paid to the issue when Germany delayed the EU limit on CO2 emissions 
from cars, at a time when it became known that the ruling party had received financial 
contributions from car manufacturer BMW (BBC 2013a; Die Zeit 2013).  
 
Pro-car organizations in industrialized countries attract vast member numbers, with for instance 
the American Automobile Association (AAA) and Allgemeiner Deutscher Automobil-Club 
(ADAC) counting 53 and 17 million members respectively (AAA 2013; ADAC 2013). There 
is ample evidence of these organizations’ influence on national transport policies through 
critical reporting on speed limits, alcohol limits, congestion charges or road tolls. Largely 
unrecognized, car organizations may also be particularly active in low- and middle-income 
countries, where the ability of governments and civil society to counteract campaigns is often 
more limited (Douglas et al. 2011). Very limited research appears to exist in the context of 
lobbying and its influence on transportation policy making. 
 
Key issues in climatically sustainable transport systems remain ignored 
Several measures are widely acknowledged as having significant importance for reducing 
transport emissions. For cars, these include speed limits, as well as congestion charges and road 
tolls/vignettes. Speed limits reduce emissions in various ways. First of all, reduced speeds 
demand lower energy input. For Germany, it has been calculated that introducing a speed limit 
of 120 km/h would reduce emissions from cars by 2%, corresponding to 2.2 Mt CO2 (UBA 
2010). This calculation does not include knock-on effects. For instance, the VCD (2008) reports 
that the average engine power of cars in Germany has increased from 57 kW in 1985 to 74 kW 
in 2006, with the share of cars capable to drive >200 km/h growing from 7.6% in 1995 to 19.0% 
in 2006. Speed limits would in turn lead to the introduction of lighter cars and more economical 
tyres and braking systems (EC, 2011), while engines could also be optimized in lower speed 
classes (UBA, 2010). Other effects include more constant transport flows and increasing 
competitiveness of other transport modes, such as trains (UBA, 2010; VCD, 2008). Yet, even 
though speed limits have been discussed in Germany for decades, with polls regularly revealing 
that a broad majority of the population supports a maximum speed limit of 130 km/h (e.g. ARD, 
2013; BUND, 2007; Süddeutsche Zeitung, 2010), the German chancellor announced in 2007 
that she would not support a speed limit (VCD 2008).  
 
As another example, Denmark increased speed limits on highways from 110 to 130 km/h in 
2004, which also caused a rise in traffic accidents (Hels et al. 2011). A similar situation exists 
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in the Netherlands, where speed limits were raised to 130 km/h (Rijkswaterstaat 2011), in spite 
of concerns voiced by the Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency (PBL 2010). An 
exception to the general rule of speed increases in several European countries is Spain, where 
the government implemented speed limits as a measure to reduce fuel consumption after the 
financial crisis and as a reaction to increasing fuel prices (Asensio et al. 2014). Speed limits are 
of particular importance in urban areas, where comparative speeds are important in transport 
mode choices, and in particular the use of bicycles. Where speeds of motorized transport modes 
are reduced, interest in bicycling and walking appear to increase. Various other examples exist 
of measures contributing to significant reductions in emissions, but these are rarely 
implemented, even though they might gain considerable support in the population. For an 
example of a congestion charge policy first rejected and later demanded by a majority of 
residents in Stockholm, see Börjesson et al. (2012). Other measures, such as car free days, are 
now apparently unthinkable in the EU, indicating an issue that is taboo, and consequently 
requiring continued research efforts. 
 
Mobility consumption patterns represent the very fabric of contemporary societies  
Mobility patterns in the EU are also a result of cultural practices and social norms, in which 
technology, knowledge structures and emotions are involved (Sheller and Urry, 2006). It has 
thus been argued that the individual is not “…necessarily a sovereign, autonomous agent but 
rather the carrier and in some ways even the product of the practices in which s/he is involved” 
(Schwanen and Lucas, 2011: 22). Car and aircraft in particular have produced lifestyles, 
relations, communities, work and recreation patterns that represent socialization into specific 
norms and habits of mobility consumption (Frändberg, 2008; Lassen, 2006; Schwanen et al. 
2012), shaping individual and national identities (Adey, 2010; Edensor, 2004). This is relevant, 
because mobility patterns are difficult to restructure or re-design when they permeate society. 
Mobility patterns also affect our social standing in society, often measured by the distance 
flown or driven, or time spent abroad. Mobility is a precondition for social status, demanding 
participation, for instance, in exchange programmes, or frequent and distant travel (Urry, 2011).  
 
This valuing of the consumption of distance (Larsen and Guiver, 2013) is expressed in and 
symbolized by large, powerful or expensive cars, private aircraft, or high frequent flyer status: 
where mobility becomes an enabler of social status and identity, it is no longer a choice or an 
option, rather it is a necessity. Airlines consequently portray frequent flying as desirable, while 
car manufacturers promote powerful cars and automobility-centred lifestyles. Car expos are 
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cultural mass events, attended by hundreds of thousands of visitors in days (e.g. IAA, 2012). 
Children are embedded in car cultures from early childhood (Sheller, 2004) and targeted in 
frequent flyer programmes (Gössling and Nilsson, 2010), only to be later on enrolled and 
socialized in programmes for car driving teenagers and young adults as offered by AAA (2013) 
and ADAC (2013). Aggressive and fast driving is institutionalized in car races (see Mabon, 
2013), i.e. deeply nationalized events treating race car drivers as heroes. Fast driving or 
exceeding the speed limit is often understood to represent power, maleness and daringness, 
rather than a traffic offense (Gössling, 2013).  
 
More generally, the car is now one of the most important items of individualized consumption. 
It provides status to its owner through sign-values that include speed, home, safety, sexual 
success, career, achievement, freedom, family or masculinity (Urry 2007). Cars also develop 
into highly personalized goods that systematically reduce mental and corporeal insufficiencies, 
including obesity (see Wen et al. 2006), while increasing the driver’s capabilities and 
productivity. Personalized cars reduce anxieties and build more confident car owner identities 
and personalities, while becoming trusted, anthropomorphized partners. This has consequences 
for mobility consumption and interventions to change behaviour, because emotionally attached 
drivers are likely to drive more (e.g. Nilsson and Küller, 2000), while their psychological 
dependence on motorized individual mobility increases, also because of gains in self-esteem. 
Where cars are seen as ‘partners’, they need to be treated with respect, and where policy makers 
restrict car use, this often results in negative emotions, or cognitive dissonance (see Hibbert 
2013a, 2013b), as social norms have been violated and order disrupted (Douglas, 1966). These 
interrelationships highlight that mobility consumption has importance beyond the functional, 
with strong symbolic and affective dimensions (Murtagh et al.2012; Sheller 2004) that socially 
construct touching these issues as taboo. Hence “measures [to reduce emissions] would have to 
include … new unconventional instruments, such as bans on commercial advertising and 
glamorisation of high CO2 vehicles and certain types of carbon intensive travel in urban areas” 
(Banister et al. 2012: 468). Mechanisms of glamorization and the psychological functions of 
mobility thus deserve to be studied in greater detail. 
 
Emerging societal structures are ignored 
Scenarios projecting future transport volume growth are unlikely to fully incorporate changes 
in societal structures and motivations for travel, which to an increasing degree focus on the 
maintenance of social networks (Larsen et al., 2007). These now include family structures 
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characterized by single households, separate housing, patchwork families, multiple (seasonal) 
housing, cross-cultural relationships over countries and continents, as well as global friendship 
and family structures, or movement for work (Beck and Beck-Gernsheim, 2014). Data for the 
EU shows that on average 13% of the population live alone, with higher shares in Denmark, 
Finland and Germany (19%) and Sweden (24%). Single household shares appear to grow (e.g. 
Statistisches Bundesamt, 2012, for Germany), and there is also an increasing share of single 
parents and children growing up between two households.  
 
Air travel in particular is an important agent of change, as it shapes new perceptions of distance, 
space, and time, while creating new ways and rhythms of dwelling, travelling, and socializing 
in aeromobile time-spaces. Ultimately, this may necessitate more frequent bouts of movement 
(Adey et al, 2007; see also Kesselring, 2006; Larsen et al. 2007), representing a fundamental 
transformation in individual mobility patterns. It is unclear how growing up in ‘liquidity’ (sensu 
Bauman, 2007) will affect mobility patterns of future generations. However, as relationships, 
marriages, family- and friendship networks, as well as working environments become global in 
character for some sections of society, this involves more travel. UNWTO (2012), for instance, 
reports that 27% of all international tourism is focused on visiting friends and relations, health 
and religion, which suggests that a bulk of these mobilities are not necessarily viewed as a 
matter of choice. Impinging on these visiting friends and relatives mobilities, amongst other 
forms of non-discretionary travel, through restrictive transport governance has to date 
constituted a largely untouchable and insufficiently studied issue. 
 
Conclusions 
Technological innovation alone is unlikely to reduce transport emissions in line with EU and 
global mitigation objectives (e.g. Anable et al., 2012; Banister, 2008, 2011; Chapman, 2007; 
Daly and Ó Gallachóir, 2011; Dubois et al. 2011; Dray et al. 2012; Hill et al. 2012; IEA, 2013; 
UNWTO-UNEP-WMO, 2008). While policy makers discuss a wide range of policy measures 
aimed at working towards these objectives (e.g. OECD and UNEP, 2011), few are 
implemented. Notably, year-on-year reduction targets do not exist, and integrated models for 
EU wide transport to assess how various policies might interact, and with what result, have 
never been developed. It may thus be argued that current climate governance with regards to 
transport in the EU justifies continued growth in transport volumes rather than initiating longer-
term change. 
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This paper has argued that this situation may partially be explicable on the basis of a series of 
interrelated and interdependent ‘transport taboos’, i.e. issues that constitute cognitive and 
affective barriers to significant decarbonisation of transport systems, as they constitute a risk to 
decision makers, who would be viewed as violators of norms and values. Taboos include, first 
and foremost, an industry-led discourse that decarbonisation is on-going on the basis of 
technological innovation. This may be seen in the context of highly skewed contributions to 
transport volumes, with the most highly mobile transport elites being directly or indirectly 
involved in or even in charge of policy-making. Highly mobile travellers have also been 
identified as particularly reluctant to give up hypermobile lifestyles, while market-based 
measures may paradoxically force in particular the less mobile to change their transport 
behaviour.  
 
Policy makers are also influenced by climate change contrarians, and car- and aviation lobbies, 
who are all engaged in considerable efforts to implement an understanding that all mobility is 
good, while environmental problems can be resolved largely through technology. At the same 
time, lobbies engage in measures to enrol large parts of the population in car lobby membership 
or bonus programmes, targeting specifically young adults and even children. This further 
deepens structures of liquidity, where mobility is normalized and viewed as necessity: To 
maintain social relations will require even greater mobility in the future, as friendship and 
kinship networks become increasingly global in character, another issue that is taboo. 
 
This does not overlook that significant legislation has been implemented in some countries. In 
the UK, the cost of flying has increased considerably due to the introduction of an air passenger 
duty (HMRC, 2013), and the government has pledged £400 million (€465 million) to encourage 
people to buy and drive new ultra-low emission vehicles (UK Government 2012). In France, a 
bonus-malus system has been implemented, charging buyers of less efficient and rewarding 
buyers of more efficient cars (D’Haultfœuille et al. 2011). In Denmark, the city of Copenhagen 
has initiated fundamental change to restructure the capital into an ‘eco-metropolis’ and ‘the best 
bicycle city in the world’ (City of Copenhagen, 2011). In Switzerland, ‘via sicura’ legislation 
targets excessive speeding, punishable by revocation of driving licences for at least two years 
and up to four years in jail (Bundesamt für Strassen, 2012). However, even though many of 
these measures are significant, they remain restricted to individual countries, notably without 
an objective to achieve specific emission reduction targets. Overall, they would thus, as 
exceptions, confirm the rule of policy failure. 
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This paper suggests that there is a need to more fundamentally question policy structures and 
the entrapment of transport within a neoliberal growth paradigm, considering the role and 
importance of transport taboos, which appear to prevent a more fundamental discussion of the 
obstacles that have to be overcome to implement significant mitigation policies. If pathway 
dependencies are not broken up, there is, as outlined by Hall (2013), a risk of further social 
lock-in, dominated by neoliberal, technocentric, and ecological modernisation values that make 
policy learning and the questioning of prevailing paradigms difficult. The present controversy 
over airport expansion in the UK illustrates this issue well (BBC, 2013b): the sustainability 
agenda has recently been side-lined in favour of concern over economic growth, in itself an 
issue of sacred values (Tetlock 2003), and hence taboo. Such structural and social lock-in may 
be accompanied by what could be termed a social rebound effect in terms of dwindling public 
support for climatically sustainable transport policies, i.e. a reaction to political inaction. 
Currently, public support for mitigation policies appears to be high (Eurobarometer, 2011), but 
there is a risk that lack of political willpower will lead to the acceptance of climate risks as an 
unavoidable evil in the risk society (Beck, 2007), making behavioural change redundant.  
 
It has been the intention of this paper to provide the basis for research into a new concept, 
transport taboos, and the role of such taboos in explaining the failure of mobility governance to 
sufficiently address climate mitigation for passenger transportation. Further research into each 
of the taboos presented in this paper is needed, however, to systematically assess their 
complexity and specific, and possibly often interrelated, roles in the observed ‘implementation 
gap’ of sustainable transport policies. As Douglas (1966) underlines, to touch a taboo creates 
disorder. Yet, in touching taboos there then also is potentiality to re-order, even though this 
may require overcoming psychological barriers both on the side of those touching taboos and 
those holding taboos sacred. Tetlock (2003) suggests that where ‘sacred values’ – in this context 
represented as unrestricted mobility – have to be traded against resource scarcity and climate 
change – represented by significantly higher prices for mobility, i.e. politically implemented, 
economic instruments to regulate transport systems -, such trade-offs need to be framed as 
‘tragic’ if they are to stand a chance to be accepted. Addressing taboos is not without danger or 
political risk, however: “when economic necessity collides with cultural identity and moral-
religious imperatives, and in the modern world such collisions are common, the resulting 
dissonance can be excruciating” (Tetlock, 2003: 320). Where order disintegrates, this will result 
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in anger and contempt, enthusiastic support for norm and meta-norm enforcement, and the 
punishment of violators.  
 
We thus conclude that overcoming taboos will be fraught with difficulty; yet, without 
overcoming taboos, significant sustainable transport policies on a broader scale are unlikely to 
emerge. More empirical research on taboos is needed to create a basis for such change. We 
suggest that this may involve the perspectives of policy makers on issues identified as ‘taboo’, 
as well as research focused on ‘sacred’ transport values and their underlying psychology. 
Mobility clearly has many functions and meanings that are rational only through social and 
clinical psychological lenses, and it will require a better understanding of these processes to 
address and overcome transport taboos. Besides these more fundamental research gaps, various 
other research topics are thinkable, including mobility consumption inequalities, and the 
transport psychologies of the hypermobile; transportation ethics; cost distribution and the 
impact of market-based measures; the role and impact of transport lobbyism; or mechanisms of 
social glamorization. To address these research gaps will require a considerable research effort, 
without which the implementation of significant sustainable transport policies is however 
unlikely. 
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